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Standing Solves the Injury Mystery in
Robinson-Patman Actions
I.

Introduction

Antitrust commentators have repeatedly denounced the Robinson-Patman price discrimination law' as anticompetitive in its appli-

cation and design.'

This plethora of criticism 3 stems from

1. Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1976)). See infra note 43. Since its enactment, the Robinson-Patman Act has been a target of
vehement criticism and movements for reform and repeal. Critics allege that oftentimes the
Act promotes discrimination and thwarts competition. Among the most sensitive issues is the
failure of courts and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to distinguish between procompetitive and anticompetitive price discrimination in the competitive injury framework. Elias,
Robinson-Patman: Timefor Rechireling 26 MERCER L. REV. 689, 689 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Elias]; La Rue, Recent JudicialEfforts to Reconcile the Robinson-PatmanAct with the Sherman Act, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 325, 326 (1979) [hereinafter cited as La Rue]. The Act does
not command the same respect as the Sherman Act because it is allegedly antithetical to antitrust directives and unnecessary for compliance with antitrust policy. Adelman, PriceDiscrimination as Treated in the Attorney General'sReport, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 222, 242 (1955); Rowe,
Price Discrimination,Competitionand Confusion. Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE
L.J. 929, 974-75 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Rowe, Another Look].
2. Elias, supra note 1, at 689. See also F.T.C. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349
(1968); Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. F.T.C., 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953). Fervent emotional
tones pervade Robinson-Patman literature. Murray, Injury to Competition Under the Robinson-PatmanAct. Futility Revisited, 29 U. PiTr. L. REV. 623, 625 n. 13 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Murray]. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 530 (1963) (Harlan, J.) ("singularly
opaque and elusive statute"); Bork, The Place ofAntitrust Among NationalGoals, in the IMPACT OF ANTITRUST ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 9 (Nat'l Indus. Conf. Bd., Fifth Conference on
Antitrust in an Expanding Economy, March 3, 1966) ("Typhoid Mary" of antitrust); Kelley,
FunctionalDiscounts Under the Robinson-PatmanAct, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 526, 533 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Kelley] ("ambiguous, jejune, and complex"). See generally F. ROWE, PRICE
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 535, 535 & n.4 (1962) [hereinafter cited

as F. ROWE]. The Act is, however, comprehensible absent the veil of emotion. Murray, supra,
at 625. And because the FTC remains unconvinced that the Act is outdated or anticompetitive, it is unlikely that 45 years of judicial and administrative interpretation will be discarded.
Kintner, Henneberger & Fleischaker, Reform ofthe Robinson-PatmanAct:. A Second Look, 21
ANTITRUST BULL. 203, 203-04 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kintner, A Second Look]. The
Robinson-Patman Act enjoys "sacrosanct status" and thus its repeal is neither anticipated nor
politically expedient. Elias, supra note i, at 691. Congress is unwilling to contravene small
businessmen who regard the Act as their "Magna Carta." La Rue, supra note 1, at 236; see F.
ROWE, supra, at 551-55. Moreover, FTC activity during the recent past indicates a renewed
interest in enforcing the Act. Kintner, Smith & Goldston, The Effect of the FederalTrade
Commission Improvements Act of 1980 on the FTC's Rulemaking and Enforcement Authority, 58
WASH. U.L. REV. 847, 858 (1980). Even though discredited, the price discrimination law continues "as if indeed chiseled in immutable tablets of stone." Elias, supra note 1, at 689. But see
Rowe, PoliticalObJectives and Economic Effects of the Robinson-PatmanAct.: A Conspicuous
U.S Antitrust Policy Failure, 136 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT 499,
508 (1980) ("In retrospect, over its forty-year history the Robinson-Patman Act failed in its
political goal of protecting small merchants against the emerging economic rule of mass
distribution.").
3. The leading critics of the Robinson-Patman Act include C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMI-

inadequate judicial analysis of the Act's competitive injury language.4 The absence of a practicable evidentiary test for this injury
to competition requirement remains a significant obstacle for the

courts to overcome. A new judicial approach to the competitive injury language of the price discrimination law should help clarify the
Robinson-Patman Act and reconcile it with basic antitrust
directives.5
NATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (2d ed. 1959); D.
BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, SUMMARY AND CONTENT (1964); C. EDWARDS, THE
PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW (1959); F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1962 & Supp. 1964); A. SAWYER, BUSINESS ASPECTS OF PRICING UNDER
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1963); M. Blakeney, Price DiscriminationLaws: A4n Economic
Perspective, 19 DUQUESNE L. REV. 479, 480 n.4 (1981). See also ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1977) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE REP.]; REPORT OF NIXON TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION, reprinted
in 413 ANTITRUST TRADE & REG. REP. (BNA) x- I (June 10, 1969) [hereinafter cited as STIGLER REP.]; Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, reprintedin 415 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) Pt. 2 at c-16 (Supp. May 26, 1969) [hereinafter cited as
NEAL REP.]; National Committee to Study theAntitrust Laws, ATT'Y GEN. OF THE U.S., ANTI-

(1955) [hereinafter cited as ATT'Y GEN. REP.].
4. The competitive injury language in section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman amendments reads in pertinent part as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities
are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any territory
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the
jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them.
15 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976).
5. The courts have a duty to reconcile the administration of the Robinson-Patman Act
with the broader aims of the antitrust laws. The Act should be interpreted to encourage, instill,
and maintain active competition in the business community. E. KINTNER, A RoBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 119 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as E. KINTNER]. Reconciliation of the Act
with antitrust directives can be achieved through an inquiry into the competitive injury requirement. This "reconciliation" theme acknowledges the conflict in philosophy between the
price discrimination law and antitrust policy, and seeks to give the Act at least some semblance
of "inner logic." Rahl,AntitrustPolicy in Distribution, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 185, 208 (1955). The
underlying philosophy of the Act presupposes an interpretation that will protect the basic vitality of the competitive process. Note, Competitive Injury Under the Robinson-PatmanAct, 74
HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1614 (1961).
In Automatic Canteen Co. of Am. v. F.T.C., 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953), the Supreme Court
acknowledged its own duty to reconcile interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act with
broader antitrust policies. The Court's approach in that case suggested a realistic application
of the competitive injury concept, focusing on the vitality of competition rather than the profits
of competitors. F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 555; cf. Elias, supra note 1, at 731 n. 164 (relating to
the apparent conflict between a price fixing conspiracy under the Sherman Act and the meeting competition defense under the Robinson-Patman Act). Contra F.T.C. v. Henry Broch &
Co., 366 U.S. 166, 170 (1960) (Court passed issue of whether the fact that a transaction may
not violate one section of the Act means that another section has been violated); Elias, supra
note 1, at 692 (the Supreme Court has demonstrated little inclination toward reconciling the
Act with other antitrust laws).
Three recent developments that indicate judicial tendencies toward a substantial reconciliation of the Act with Sherman pricing policy include the following: (1) a line of current court
decisions adopting the theory set forth in Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); (2) the Supreme
TRUST LAWS

Until recently, the Supreme Court had addressed only broad aspects of the requirement of legal injury to competition and the rela-

tionship of this requirement to proof of damages.6 In J Truett Payne
Co. v. ChryslerMotors Corp.,7 however, the Court attempted to clar-

ify the competitive injury requirement of the price discrimination
law.8 The majority 9 concluded that "even if there has been a viola-

tion of the Robinson-Patman Act, [a private litigant] is not excused
from his burden of proving antitrust injury and damages. It is simply that once a violation has been established, that burden is to some
extent lightened."'" The dissent argued that the majority not only
failed to dispel confusion about the competitive injury requirement,
but also increased the uncertainty surrounding the price discrimina-

tion law.'t Neither the majority nor minority opinion discussed criteria applicable to the burden of proving competitive injury in a
private treble damage action.12 In application, the majority's ambiguous language may stifle judicial development of an analytical

framework within which to examine competitive injury in a RobinCourt's landmark decision in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978),
which allowed application of the Robinson-Patman's meeting competition defense to the Sherman Act price-fixing doctrine; and (3) the Supreme Court's decision in Great Atd. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. F.T.C., 440 U.S. 69 (1979), which relaxed the Robinson-Patman Act's restraints on
seller-buyer price bargaining. La Rue, supra note 1, at 326-28.
6. Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and Proofof Damages in Treble Damage
Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 231, 283 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Timberlake].
7. 451 U.S. 557 (1981). The petitioner in Payne sued Chrysler alleging that the manufacturer retail sales incentive programs violated section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a jury award of damages and attorneys fees and directed entry of judgment for Chrysler on the basis that Payne presented insufficient proof of
both injury and the amount of damages. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne, Inc., 607
F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1979). On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of
appeals and remanded the case.
In this case, however, we cannot say with assurance that respondent is a "wrongdoer." Because the court below bypassed the issue of liability and went directly to
the issue of damages, we simply do not have the benefit of its views as to whether
respondent in fact violated § 2(a).
Accordingly, we think the proper course is to remand the case so that the Court
of Appeals may pass upon respondent's contention that the evidence adduced at trial
was insufficient to support a finding of violation of the Robinson-Patman Act ...
If the court determines on remand that respondent did violate the Act, the court
should then consider the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence of injury.
451 U.S. at 568. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. J. Truett Payne Co., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64615 (5th Cir. 1982) (on remand, the Court directed entry ofjudgment for Chrysler on the
basis that insufficient evidence existed to support a finding of either violation of the RobinsonPatman Act, or any antitrust injury or damages).
8. See Elias, supra note 1.
9. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Burger, Stewart, White, and Stevens joined. Justice Powell filed an opinion dissenting in part in which
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined.
10. Payne, 451 U.S. at 568.
11. Id at 570.
12. The Court discussed injury only as it related to proof of treble damages. The Court
has consistently permitted inferences of the requisite injury from a showing of price discrimination in injunctive action. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). But the
Court in Payne disagreed with petitioner's argument that private suits for damages under § 4
of the Clayton Act should not be treated differently.

13
son-Patman case.

After a brief overview of the origins of the Robinson-Patman
Act and the elements of a prima facie violation, this comment examines competitive injury in the context of both Federal Trade Commission prosecutions and private treble damage actions. Analysis
and critique of the judicial apparatus illustrate the difficulty of the
present approach to overcome the uncertainty and inconsistency inherent in price discrimination cases. This comment proposes one soconsistent
lution to the competitive injury issue that could achieve
4
and effective results in Robinson-Patman actions. '

II. Background
A.

Origins of the Robinson-PatmanAct

The current price discrimination law is an outgrowth of multiple congressional efforts to create and preserve economic innovation
as well as regulate business excesses. In the first of these efforts, the
Sherman Act,'" Congress responded to the massive trusts of the late
nineteenth century. At the time of its enactment, the Sherman Act
constituted the sole weapon against monopolistic practices. 16 Yet,
the two decades following enactment of that legislation demonstrated the Act's inability to regulate such monopolistic practices as
exclusive arrangements, mergers, interlocking directorates, and certain types of price discrimination."' By 1912, a strong undercurrent

of demand for flexible legislation to ensure free and fair competition
forced new congressional action. Passage of the Clayton Act 8 and
13. See Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverages, Inc., 654 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1981),
petitionfor cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. March 1, 1982) (No. 81-1271).
14. The Robinson-Patman price discrimination law has always been covertly frustrated.
Barber, PrivateEnforcement of the Antitrust Laws.- The Robinson-PatmanExperience, 30 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 181, 230 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Barber]. Nevertheless, the Act could have
procompetitive effect as designed if the courts would apply standing to sue as a preliminary
requirement. See infra notes 121-49 and accompanying text.
15. Sherman Act. ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)). The
Sherman Act outlaws contracts, combinations, and conspiracies that restrain trade in interstate
commerce and prohibits monopolies, attempts to monopolize, or conspiracies with others to
monopolize in interstate commerce. The basic principle of antitrust and trade regulation is a
conservative belief that the unhampered interplay of free market forces produces optimal benefits. E. KINTNER, supra note 5, at 3.
16. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 4, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW VOLUME I, 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA MONOGRAPH].
17. The vagueness of the Sherman Act rendered businessmen unable to depend on it as a
guide. Also, the judicially created "rule of reason" proved inadequate to prevent the amalgamation of independent and diverse competitors in monopolistic combinations. See Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-61 (1911) (White, C.J.) (rule of reason). Under the
Sherman Act, those engaged in price discrimination violative of antitrust policy argued before
the Supreme Court that they acquired monopolistic positions through lawful means. ABA
MONOGRAPH, supra note 16, at 6.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-26 (1976).

the Federal Trade Commission Act 19 of 1914 ensued. Congress created each to deal with then observed anticompetitive practices left

unaffected by the Sherman Act.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act of 1914,20 precursor to the Robinson-Patman amendments, embodied the first legislative attempt to
specifically regulate price discrimination. This provision addressed
the predatory tactics of national trusts by restricting direct price discrimination among sellers motivated to cutthroat competition.2' Un22
fortunately, enforcement activities between 1914 and 1920 failed.
The ineffectiveness of the Federal Trade Commission's enforcement
mechanism resulted primarily from the inability of section 2 to anticipate the unprecedented expansion of the chain store. This development, which caused a breakdown in the traditional manufacturer19. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, §§ 1-18, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified
as amended at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-58 (1980)).
20. Clayton Act, ch. 434, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1976)).
21. F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 6. The impetus behind the legislation stemmed from widespread condemnation of the predatory pricing tactics of trusts of that era. Id at 15. A report
by the House Committee on the Judiciary stated as follows:
Section 2 of the bill . . . is expressly designed with the view of correcting and
forbidding a common and widespread unfair trade practice whereby certain great
corporations and also certain smaller concerns which seek to secure a monopoly in
trade and commerce by aping the methods of the great corporations, have heretofore
endeavored to destroy competition and render unprofitable the business of competitors by selling their goods, wares, and merchandise at a less price in the particular
communities where their rivals are engaged in business than at other places throughout the country.
C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAWS 5-6 (1959) [hereinafter cited as C. EDWARDS]

(quoting Antitrust Legislation, H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1960 (1935)). See
F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543 (1960); Bolick-Gillman Co. v. Continental
Baking Co., 206 F. Supp. 151, 154 n.4 (D. Nev. 1961). See also S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-4 (1936). The statute prohibited price discrimination "where the effect of such discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce." 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
22. C. EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 6. The FTC issued only eight valid cease and desist
orders. Additionally, only four Department of Justice price discrimination violation proceedings, all of which were primarily Sherman Act cases, occurred. Id As for private suits, there
were some, but all the provisos in § 2 were characterized as "a dead letter." ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 16, at II n.39 (citing B. ZORN & G. FELDMAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW
PRICE LAWS, A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT AND THE VARIOUS FAIR TRADE AND UNFAIR PRACTICES LAWS 40-

41 (1937)). The FTC blamed the Act's defense provisos for the hiatus in enforcement. These
provisos permitted virtually uniform reversal of the FTC's decisions if appealed. C. EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 11.
Three major difficulties account for the poor record of enforcement. First, initiallycourts
only reluctantly applied § 2 to discrimination that tended to lessen competition in the resale
market served by the seller's favored customers, ie., secondary-line. See, e.g., National Biscuit
Co. v. F.T.C., 299 F. 733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 613 (1924); Mennen Co. v. F.T.C., 288
F. 774 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 759 (1923); cf. George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929) (Supreme Court repudiated their earlier interpretation and
extended application of § 2 to buyers). Second, § 2 immunized unlimited price differentials in
the form of quantity discounts giving chain stores "carte blanche" for unlimited purchasing
advantages. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. F.T.C., 22 FTC 232, 331-32 (1936), vacated,
101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939). Finally, and perhaps the most
serious loophole, the meeting competition defense granted immunity to all pricing retaliation.
See generally C. EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 6; F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 7-10.

wholesaler-retailer distribution, proved to be the reason for the de23
mise of the price discrimination provision of the Clayton Act.
The Robinson-Patman amendments reflect a time when economic conditions, if not critically depressed, were far from prosper-

ous. Independent merchants injured by the chain store momentum
instigated Congress to respond to their critical and changing economic situation.24 In 1928, the Senate passed a resolution 2 5 that or-

dered the FTC to investigate the legality of chain store practices. In
its final report,26 the Commission recognized, however, the potential
harm of depriving chain stores of price concessions corresponding to
their operating efficiencies and purchasing advantages. Accordingly,

it proposed only a moderate program of legislative reform. Simultaneously, during the height of this investigation, the Commission
promulgated the Codes of Fair Competition under the National Industrial Recovery Act 27 to protect distributors and retailers. Mass
distributors, however, fiercely resisted; the codes failed, and confusion persisted until the Supreme Court's decision in A.L.A. Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States,2 8 which struck down the codes as an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. This failure of
the codes combined with the FTC's final report culminated in the
original Patman bill, forerunner to the 1936 amendments to the
Clayton Act.29
During the Robinson-Patman debates, members of Congress
expressed particular concern with the method by which courts would

recognize harmful price discriminations. To address this issue, the
23. During the post-world War I era, expanding distributors competed for control of the
marketing function. Department stores represented the first significant concentration of retailers' buying power while mail order "houses" expanded in rural areas. Chain stores emerged as
the most potent threat to the traditional market distribution scheme. ABA MONOGRAPH,
supra note 16, at 9. The breakdowns in the traditional method of distribution became obvious
as the trend toward mass marketing and absentee ownership emerged. This change in market
structure resulted, in large part, from the ability of the chain stores to buy directly from the
manufacturer, passing the traditional middleman. Chain stores afford large volume buyers a
tremendous competitive advantage and extraordinary leverage over the manufacturer. Quantity discounts as well as promotional services were prevalent. A total circumvention of the
application of § 2 by the chain store industry resulted. It is not clear that Congress understood
the various forms or possibilities of discrimination. J. MILLER, UNFAIR COMPETITION: A
STUDY IN THE CRITERIA FOR THE CONTROL OF TRADE PRACTICES 131 (1941) (cited in ABA
MONOGRAPH, supra note 16, at 8). Supporters of the Act lacked sophistication at the level of
economic theory required to recognize fundamental differences between the protection of competitors and the maintenance of competition. Kelley, supra note 2, at 533.
24. F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 8.
25. S. RES. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 CONG. REC. 7857 (1928).
26. FTC, CHAIN STORES: FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN-STORE INVESTIGATION, S.
Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). Although Congress incorporated the Commission's
proposals into the first bills introduced in Congress, the proposals had no discernible effect on
the final compromise bill. ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 16, at 14.
27. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933).
28. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
29. H.R. 8442, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) and S. 3154, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935),
reprintedin F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 560-61.

legislature amended section 2(a) of the Clayton Act to ban price differentials only
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce, or to injure, destroy, orprevent competition with anyperson who eithergrants or receives the benefits of such discrimination,
or with customers of either of them. 30
Through this amendment, Congress reemphasized its intent to guard

against monopolistic and anticompetitive practices "in their incipiency before harm to competition is effected [sic]."' I Additionally, in

an attempt to make the law more precise, Congress extended the
political concept of discrimination beyond that contained in the orig-

inal Clayton Act.3 2 This political movement greatly expanded antitrust protection of small businessmen.
The amendments clearly indicate that Congress did not intent to
insulate the Act from economic analysis. Nevertheless, it failed to
fully appreciate the difficulty and complexity of regulating the economic structure of the marketplace.3 3
B.

Overview of Enforcement of the Price DiscriminationLaw

The Robinson-Patman Act is primarily enforced through two
separate provisions of the Clayton Act of 1914. Section 11 of the
30. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) (emphasis added). This additional language was aimed at
protecting individual customers of the seller. Congress was intent upon strengthening the
Clayton provisions. See F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1960); F.
ROWE, supra note 2, at 121.
31. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945); F. ROWE, supra note 2, at
15. The Clayton Act was criticized as
too restrictive, in requiring a showing of general injury to competitive conditions in
the line of commerce concerned; whereas the more immediately important concern is
in injury to the competitor victimized by the discrimination. Only through such injuries, in fact, can the larger general injury result, and to catch the weed in the seed will
keep it from coming to flower.
Id (citing S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936). See Hearings Before the House
Comm. on the JudiciaryBills to Amend the Clayton Act, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 144, 251 (1935);
Comment, The Injury Requirement of the Robinson-PatmanAct, 49 Nw. U.L. REV, 197, 197-98,
203 (1954).
32. Enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act as an amendment to the Clayton Act, rather
than as a separate price discrimination law, could be viewed as a political masterstroke intended to interpret this anti-chain store measure in the same policy vein as other antitrust laws.
See F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 23.
33. The final compromise of the Act does not reflect any clear-cut congressional objectives. Rowe, Expectation Versus Accomplishment Under the Robinson-PatmanAct, 1936-1960."
A Statement of the Issues, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. 298, 301 (1960).

34. A third provision that grants relief to Robinson-Patman complainants is the private
injunctive remedy. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514.(1954); Kuntson v. Daily
Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
Finally, the Department of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute violators pursuant to the § 3 criminal provision of the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1976). See F.
ROWE,

supra note 2, at 452-75. The Justice Department rarely, however, invokes § 3, leaving

the Act's enforcement to the FTC. E. KINTNER, supra note 5, at 313. See Nashville Milk Co.

v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 378 n.7 (1958). The Supreme Court has construed this provision as not creating any private damage remedy, thus drastically limiting its significance. See

Clayton Act authorizes the FTC to enforce the price discrimination
law.3" Section 4 of the Clayton Act 36 authorizes private enforcement
of the Robinson-Patman Act. That section provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue for threefold his
actual damages, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees." 3 7 Private
lawsuits have proved more effective than public actions and thus
now constitute the chief means of enforcement.3" Through this
treble damage remedy, Congress has enlisted the courts and private
Nashville Milk Co. v Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958). Section 3 provides little guidance to
businessmen who must conform to its mandates. They are unclear as to its application and
uncertain of its use as a tool of antitrust enforcement. E. KINTNER, supra note 5, at 293.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1976). The FTC also relies on enforcement authority from § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-58 (1980). See E. KINTNER, supra note 5,
at 313. See generally Austern, Required Competitive Injury and PermittedMeeting of Competition, NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N (1947) [hereinafter cited as Austern].
36. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). Private litigation can be linked to public enforcement for two
reasons. First, because all unappealed FTC orders automatically become final after 60 days,
they can be relied on as definitive adjudications. A party that violates an FTC order incurs a
fine, although the Clayton Act and FTC Act impose different dollar penalties. Second, in
some cases, a contested government proceeding provides prima facie evidence of an antitrust
violation in a subsequent private suit. Thus, the risk of private litigation arising out of a governmental or public action imposes even greater pressure on respondents to settle with the
FTC, rather than force the issue to a contested resolution. Both types of enforcement are
obviously capable of imposing serious consequences on the defendant.
37. Injured parties most frequently pursue a claim or counterclaim for treble damages.
Nonetheless, either party may seek a declaratory judgment to void an arrangement on the
basis of illegality under the Act. F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 528. The litigant may, of course,
also bring suit to restrain future violations of the Act pursuant to the injunctive remedy of the
Clayton Act. Courts, however, loathe imposing this remedy to constrain a defendant's pricing
freedom as an outgrowth of a private antitrust controversy. Id at 529. See Wall St. J., July
14, 1982, at 52, col. I.
38. The initial years of enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act indicated that private
action had not been a very significant factor. Several reasons may explain the demonstrated
ineffectiveness of private enforcement. First, private litigants encounter severe obstacles in
their attempt to procure the sufficient requisite evidence because, unlike the FTC, they have no
formal grants of general inquisitorial authority.
Second, the competitive injury requirement imposes additional proof problems in a
Robinson-Patman case. Private litigants are typically forced to prove the fact of violation and
the fact of damages de novo. Proof problems and the significance of explicit defenses in the
statutory language have made this task especially arduous. Furthermore, not only have the
courts failed to articulate standards that define the evidentiary parameters of a competitive
injury, but extraordinary problems also arise regarding proof of damages. In many cases,
failure to adequately prove damages has resulted in the ultimate denial of compensation to
private litigants, even after they have successfully proved a violation of the Act.
Finally, the realities of private antitrust litigation, Ze., cost, time, and the inequality of
economic power, often overwhelm private litigants. Before bringing suit, the plaintiff must
weigh the certainty of high cost with the risk of defeat. These considerations serve to enhance
the defendant's bargaining position in favor of settlement. Many prospective private parties
either forego a treble damage action or agree to a settlement prior to trial, merely to avoid the
hardships of a private treble damage suit. Cf.Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E.
1077, 1080 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (free competition is worth more than its cost).
For these reasons, neither plaintiffs nor defendants take lightly the risk of private litigation. Plaintiffs' attorneys warily pursue such actions unless they are reasonably sure of success,
and correspondingly, defendants' attorneys are quick to settle to avoid expense and adverse
publicity. See Barber, supra note 14, at 201-10. See also Antitrust Procedure Improvements
Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-349, 94 Stat. 1154, 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (1980). See generally Loevinger,
Handling a Plaintiff's Antitrust Damage Suit, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 29 (1959); Stigler, Mergers
and PreventiveAntitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176 (1955).

parties to further advance antitrust action.
III.

9

Judicial Analytic Framework

The Robinson-Patman amendments to the Clayton Act com40
prise all provisions governing the legality of price discrimination.
Section 2(a), the heart of the Act, is a prophylactic statute that pro-

hibits sellers from charging discriminatory prices which injure competition. To satisfy the jurisdictional criteria prescribed by this
provision, the complainant must show (1) consummated contemporaneous sales transactions, (2) in interstate commerce, (3) by the
same seller to different purchasers, (4) involving commodities of like
grade and quality.4 ' The satisfaction of these jurisdictional criteria,
the existence of a price differential, and a demonstration of inimical
effects produced by a discriminatory price, that is, competitive in-

jury, constitute the components of a prima facie violation of the
39. Congress designed the treble damage scheme to instigate antitrust litigation and
strengthen the impact of this legislation. Private treble damages not only deter antitrust defendants and punish wrongdoers, but also enlist parties to detect and punish antitrust violations. See Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 773, 751-52 (1947). Originally
the private antitrust remedy was designed to supplement the "public" remedy. United States
v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954). The roles are, however, reversing; it is no longer clear
which remedy is supplanting which. Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Inury, and the
Pas-sing on Doctrine, 32 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Pollock, Standing). The courts have attributed to private litigants an ancillary investigatory role that supplements the activities of governmental agencies. Comment, Standing to Suefor Treble Damages
Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 570, 571 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Treble Damages] (citing Quemos v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 949,
950 (D.N.J. 1940)).
40. Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act is in fact § 2 of the Clayton Act as amended
by §§ 2(a)-2(b) of the Robinson-Patman amendments. Sections 3 and 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a-13b,
of the Robinson-Patman Act are technically not part of the Clayton Act.
Note that price discrimination causing the requisite competitive injury, although prohibited by § 2(a), is nevertheless justifiable. Section 2(a) provides defenses that may be interposed
against a claim of price discrimination. These defenses include the following: (1) the cost
justification proviso, which provides that nothing in the Act "shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery resulting
from the differing method or quantities of commodities sold or delivered"; and (2) the changing conditions exemption, which provides that the challenged differential responds to changing
conditions affecting the market for, or the marketability of, the goods concerned. Finally,
§ 2(b) also explicitly provides a complete defense. That proviso declares that nothing in the
Act shall prevent a seller from rebutting prima facie case by showing that his lower price was
made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor.
The remaining provisions of the Robinson-Patman amendments have no counterparts in
the Clayton Act of 1914. Sections 2(c)-2(f) were legislative efforts to remedy evasions of the
Clayton Act's ban on price discrimination. See Kintner, A Second Look, supra note 2, at 20614.
41. In practice, this jurisdictional requirement precludes application of the Act to refusals to deal, noncontemporaneous transactions, and consignment or tendered nonscale arrangements. F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 45. See general,y Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175,
177-81 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972); Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417
F.2d 203, 208-10 (6th Cir. 1969); Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 787-88
(10th Cir. 1967). See Comment, The Price DiscriminationProvisions ofthe Robinson-Patnan
Act- .4 Forthcoming Clarificationofthe JurisdictionalRequirements, 5 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 562
(1974) for an examination of cases that have contributed to the confusion in determining jurisdictional scope of § 2(a).

Act.

42

Price discrimination is clearly not per se unlawful. Although
synonymous with price differential, mere price differences do not
neceasarily injure competition. 43 The legality of the price differential hinges instead on the existence of a competitive injury.
Proof of competitive injury is based on substantial evidence that
the effect of the price discrimination "may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly. in any line of commerce"
or "to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of price discrimination, or with customers of either of them."" The problems related to
the application of the competitive injury requirement are among the
most 5far reaching in efficient enforcement of the Robinson-Patman
Act.

A.

4

Competitive Injury and Causation

Much of the controversy and confusion in Robinson-Patman litigation stems from the courts' failure to distinguish between antitrust
and tort application of injury and causation concepts. 46 In tort law,
legal duty, violation of that legal duty, injury, and causation are independent elements of analysis.47 In an antitrust framework, these
elements intertwine. This difference inheres in judicial treatment of
violation of legal duty.
In tort, proof of a violation of legal duty is a purely factual issue. In antitrust, proof of a violation of legal duty is, instead, a causation issue. Only after the litigant proves that the price differential
caused a competitive injury, and thus violated the antitrust laws, can
he prove his own injury. Hence, the litigant must simultaneously
42. See, e.g., Whitaker Cable Corp. v. F.T.C., 239 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 938 (1957); E. Edelmann & Co. v. F.T.C., 239 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1956), cer. denied,
355 U.S. 941 (1958); Moog Indus., Inc. v. F.T.C., 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), at'd, 355 U.S.
411 (1958).
43. See F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); In re General Foods Corp.,
50 FTC 885, 890 (1954); ATT'Y GEN. REP., supra note 3, at 333.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). There is no statutory presumption of injury, and thus no
per se unlawful price discrimination. Moreover, there is no distinction between different kinds
of competitive injury. Finally, there is no mention of the quantum of proof necessary to establish the substantiality of advere effects on competition.
45. Courts have not precisely interpreted the statute to clarify the issue of what constitutes substantial competitive effects, thus leaving open the question of the point at which a
"nominal" effect becomes "substantial" for purposes of § 2(a). These courts instead have applied differently the term "substantially" at the various levels of injury. This flexible application has effectively rendered the term useless as a standard of competitive effect and has not
given any guidance to a determination of the burden of proof. See, e.g., Borden Co. v. F.T.C.,
381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967); Willow Run Garden Shop, Inc. v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 1973-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 74816 (D.N.J. 1973).
46. See Pollock, The "Injury" and "Causation" Elements of a PrivateAntitrust Action, 21
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. 341, 343 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Pollock, Injury and Causation].
47. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).

prove a violation of legal duty, injury to competition, and causal
connection between the price discrimination and the competitive injury. At this point, the elements become indivisible. Thus, while
under tort law, injury and causation are distinct concepts, they
merge for purposes of the private treble damage remedy.48
Note that competitive injury is not defined in terms of the causation and injury requirements of tort law. 49 This paradox results
because "fact of damage" or competitive injury does not exclusively
involve a factual question. Instead, it becomes a question of judicial
interpretation of policy: a question of proximate cause.50 Whether
the plaintifi's injury is too remote to afford recovery is a value judgment pervaded by judicial obedience to statutory language.5 ' Courts
that recognize the "semantic gyrations"52 of injury and causation exantitrust policy considpress their conclusions in terms of traditional
5 3 instead of tort principles.5 4
erations
Courts that perceive tort principles as essential to any injury
48. In antitrust, the elements of a tort action, .e., existence of violation, causation, and
injury, are typically established in two phases. This grouping of tort elements in two stages,
liability and recovery, is to some degree artificial. In private antitrust litigation, it is unnecesandMeasurement
sary. But see Comment, FederalAntitrustLaw-PriceDiscrimination-Proof
of Damages in Treble Damage Actions, 60 MICH. L. REV. 1104, 1111-15 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, ProofandMeasurement] for reasons offered to justify maintaining a distinction between proof of the existence of the fact of damage and proof of an amount of damages.
From a proof standpoint, the issues of violation, causation, and injury are not easily separated. Two possibilities are that the plaintiff cannot recover because he has failed to prove
both the fact and the amount of injury or that he can recover because he has proved both the
fact and amount of injury. Banana Distrib. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 45 (S.D.N.Y.
1958). Confusion arises because litigants are not attuned to the conceptual differences between
proof of fact of injury and proof of amount of injury. And, of course, the private litigant must
establish the fact of injury to competition before he can prepare a case for the amount of his
damages.
49. Pollock, Injury and Causation,supra note 46, at 344.
50. Id Ultimately, the fact of legal injury is a question of liability. See Response of
Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Terrell v. Household
Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 987 (1974).
51. See, e.g., Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) (possible danger
of flood of litigation); Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 823 (D. Mass. 1909)
(possibility of treble damage recoveries by more than one plaintiff for same injury); Image &
Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altee Serv. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1959) (drastic nature
of treble damage actions); Snow Crest Beverages, Inc. v. Recipe Foods, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 907,
909 (D. Mass. 1956) (unfair to allow windfall to those harmed incidentally); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1953), afd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954) (burdens placed on individual industries).
52. See Pollock, Injury and Causation,supra note 46, at 343 (injury and causation are
"chameleon words"). See also A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 221 (1960) (concern of recent case law, in the spirit of "art for art's sake," is with
the development of legal implications of the Act's language).
53. Traditional antitrust analysis looks not to whether the price discrimination has in fact
had an adverse effect on competition, but whether the price discrimination has the potential to
have the prescribed effect. E. Edelman & Co. v. F.T.C., 239 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958). See F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Corn
Prods. Ref. Co. v. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
54. In tort law, legal responsibility is limited to cases in which the wrong is so closely
connected with the result, and rises to a level of such significance, that the law justifiably
imposes liability. Social policy and justice justify an imposition of liability in accordance with
a particular set of boundaries. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 (4th ed. 1971).

analysis, however, require separate proof of injury to competition
and injury to a single competitor." These courts distinguish between the competitive injury reqirement of section 2(a) and the injury requirement of the private treble damage remedy of section 4.
They require proof of causation for each type of injury and accordingly wrestle with the result that the private litigant must "prove his
case twice." First, he must proceed through the motions of an FTC
Robinson-Patman section 2(a) price discrimination case; and second,
he must make a separate case for treble damages pursuant to section
4 of the Clayton Act. Some courts even bifurcate the trial between
proof of liability and proof of damages.5 6 Others merely treat the
price discrimination case like a merger case by extending proof of
competitive injury to proof of treble damages once legal injury is
established." Most courts are, however, caught in the middle, confused about the role of competitive injury in a price discrimination
case.58 Nonetheless, all courts are obligated to obey the strict statutory language, and are eager to make Robinson-Patman cases definable, predictable, and disposable without breaking new ground.5 9
B.

Fact of Damage Versus Amount of Damages

Two frequently confused but related concepts require distinc55. See supra note 48.
56. More recently, courts have dealt with the causation issue in this context in the setting
of a bifurcated trial. If the trial is bifurcated between liability and damages, the plaintiff must
show some evidence of a causal link between the violation and the alleged injury in the first
phase, the liability phase, before he may enter the second phase, the recovery phase. See, e.g.,
Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Terrell v.

Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 987 (1974);
Haverhill Gazette Co. v. Union Leader, 333 F.2d 798 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931
(1964); Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 357 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Wall
Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Some courts, how-

ever, refuse to bifurcate the trial since a determination of liability is not entirely separable
from the calculation of damages. These courts base their decision on the overlap between
proof of injury for liability purposes and proof of injury for recovery purposes. Hasbrouck v.

Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Alabama v. Blue Bird
F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978)).
57. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp.
1981); cf. Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 516 F. Supp.
(D.D.C. 1981).
58. See Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 466 F.2d

Body Co., 573
1100 (E.D. Pa.
1034, 1040-41
1163 (7th Cir.

1972); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410

(N.D. Cal. 1978). See also Lehman, How to Interpret a Dicult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 487
(how positivist judges, who carefully avoid judicial legislating, grapple with unclear statutes).
59. C. EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 5. The lack of absolute standards of antitrust injury
can be traced to two issues. First is the question of the relative nature of an injury. Plaintiff
must allege that he would have been better off if the defendant's alleged illegal activity had not
taken place. Pollock, Inury and Causation,supra note 46, at 344. Moreover, the incipiency
notion of § 2(a) further blurs the distinction between legitimate and frivolous claims of antitrust injury. A second and related issue is the question of the quantum of proof necessary to
establish competitive injury. The controversy surrounding the difference in proof of fact of
damage continues. See Pollock, Injury and Causation, supra note 46, at 344-45.

tion:fact of damage and amount of damages.6" Fact of damage is
competitive or legal injury.6 In other words, it encompasses the relationship between the alleged price differential and other competitive factors in the marketplace. In contrast, the amount of damages
is the quantum of damages or injury to the plaintiffs business or
property.6 2

The FTC primarily seeks to prove competitive injury rather
than an amount of damages. 6 The public action focuses on the violation itself, not the amount of the injury to competition. In this
framework, any price discrimination could well be deemed illegal.
This per se illegal approach often attempts to label a practice illegal
regardless of its procompetitive effects. Yet the specific language of

the Act clearly requires a finding of some injury to competition.65
The FTC had applied the per se proscription in the early years
of the Act's enforcement. 66 Ultimately, the Commission articulated

a standard for competitive injury. It held that a consideration of all
competent and relevant evidence of injury and the inferences that
may reasonably be drawn from that evidence should determine the

fact of injury. 67 But the FTC itself limits application of this inference standard to large volume purchasers that receive discounts

which allow them to undersell smaller competitors.68 It continues to
require more substantiated findings of competitive injury based on
60. Timberlake, supra note 6, at 236 (citing Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 180 F. Supp. 717,
723 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)).
61. Id Some courts equate impact, fact of damage, and causal link. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1314 n.7 (5th Cir. 1976).
62. Timberlake, supra note 6, at 237.
63. In re General Foods Corp., 50 FTC 885 (1954).
64. Sunderland, Antitrust Developments.- .4 New EraforCompetitive Pricing,41 A.B.A.J.
113, 113 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Sunderland].
65. The competitive injury is the crux of a "rule of reason" analysis of the price discrimination law. This fact of injury must be "determined by the light ofreason guided by principles
of law and the duty to apply and enforce public policy embodied in the statute, in every given
case whether any particular act or contract was within the contemplation of the statute." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1911). See, e.g., Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United
States, 297 U.S. 553 (1956); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). See
also Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 365 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Northern Sec. Co. v. United
States, 193 U.S. 197, 328-32 (1904); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 573-78
(1898); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 327-32 (1897). Seegenerally Van Cise, The Futureoffer Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964). The limits of
the judicial inquiry permitted by the rule of reason is delineated in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See Dove, Proof ofAntitrust Inpury in
Customer Tie-In Claims -. 4 Reappraisal, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 787, 797 n.64 (1980).
66. Sunderland, supra note 64, at 186. Circuit courts have upheld the FTC, even in the
face of direct testimony that the charged discriminatory price did not result in an injury to
competition. Id
67. In re General Foods Corp., 50 FTC 885 (1954) (restriction of inference to non-territorial price discrimination at the buyer level).
68. Id at 887-88. Discriminations under geographic pricing systems may occur in limited areas or only along the fringes of trade territories. The minimum determination of injury
should be based on a substantial probability that continued discriminations will cause competitive injury.

extensive market analysis in all other price discrimination cases.69

Nonetheless, in cases of volume discount discriminatory pricing,
the FTC liberally infers competitive injury without extensive market

analysis.7" This inference poses the greatest risk of a per se approach
to price discrimination. So far, however, fear of public confusion
has, for the most part, prevented the FTC from applying a per se
rule in price discrimination cases. 7' Because the FTC has a strong
interest in having its price discrimination law prosecutions affirmed
if appealed, the Commission will undoubtedly attempt to reconcile
the Robinson-Patman Act with other antitrust policies to improve its
own record of antitrust enforcement.72 The FTC continues to abide

by its commitment to place the burden of proving competitive injury
on its own counsel.7 3 Thus, the "rule of reason" guides Commission

enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act.74
Treble damage actions are not immune from the potential of a
per se application of the price discrimination law. In private litigation, the factfinder's inference of competitive injury is usually conclusive, and has prevailed even in the face of evidence that raises
contrary inferences. 75 Two issues of causation related to this princi69. Murray, supra note 2, at 628. See U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENT
OF POLICY TOWARD GEOGRAPHIC PRICING PRACTICES FOR STAFF INFORMATION AND GuI7-8 (1948).
70. In re General Foods Corp., 50 FTC 885 (1954), is the Commission's authoritative
statement on the competitive injury inference doctrine originally found in the decision of
F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
The aftermath of Morton Sall suggested that, while the FTC limited its application, some
courts were intent on ignoring the limitation. These courts favored the stricter standard of
competitive injury. E.g., American Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. F.T.C., 191 F.2d 786 (7th
Cir. 1951), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). Other courts deferred to the task of drawing
the inference of probable injury as long as a reasonable quantum of evidence supported the
inference. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. F.T.C., 348 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1965). It is this latter
interpretation that has contributed to the political tensions between the Robinson-Patman Act
and antitrust policy.
71. The decision in In re General Foods Corp., 50 FTC 885 (1954), provides a prime
example of the Commission's concerted attempt to effectuate broader antitrust policy by treating the inference rule as a "rule of reason" and not a per se proscription. The FTC has taken
the inference seriously by limiting the doctrine of F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37
(1948), and by imposing on its own counsel the burden of proving a competitive injury. Such
an approach amounts to consideration of all relevant evidence in the particular case.
72. The Supreme Court also recognizes the political tension between the rationales underlying the Sherman Act and the price discrimination law. In Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340
U.S. 231 (1951), the Court stated,
We need not now reconcile, in its entirety, the economic theory which underlies the
Robinson-Patman Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. It is enough to
say that Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act either to abolish competition or so radically to curtail it that a seller would have no substantial right of selfdefense against a price raid by a competitor.
Id at 249 (quoted in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 451 (1978)).
73. Placing the burden of proof on the FTC in Robinson-Patman cases produces optimal
results under the Act. Comment, The Injury Requirement ofthe Robinson-PatmanAct, 49 Nw.
U.L. REV. 197, 209 (1954).
74. See supra note 65.
75. The practical consequences of the "irrebuttable presumption" and the "rebuttable
DANCE

pie become apparent. First, the question arises whether injury to
competition resulted from the discrimination or from other factors.
Second, because the price discrimination need not have yet, in fact,
adversely affected competition, the question arises whether evidence
exists of a reasonable possibility of substantial injury in the future.
These issues further cloud the causal element of competitive injury,
resulting in a weakened, if not eliminated, causal relationship.

Consequently, a private litigant bears a considerably higher
burden of proof than the FTC.76 In addition to proving a violation
of the antitrust laws, the private litigant must prove his own pecuniary harm by clear and convincing evidence as well as prove a causal
connection between the violation and the injury. This causal nexus,
as opposed to the violation itself,77 constitutes the gist of the treble
inference" may not vary greatly. Heim, Measuring Damages in Robinson-Patman Secondary
Line PriceDiscriminationCases, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 201, 203 (1981); JUSTICE REP., supra note
3, at 13. See Petition of writ of certiorari at 13 n.17, Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverages,
Inc., 654 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 198 1),petiiionfor cer. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3695 (U.S. March 1,
1982) (No. 81-1271). See also Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v. F.T.C., 265 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959); Moog Indus., Inc. v. F.T.C., 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1956), af'd
per curiam, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
76. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), the Supreme
Court articulated the standard of evidence that sufficiently sustained the inference of competitive injury.
[Plaintiffs] burden of proving the fact of damage under § 4 of the Clayton Act is
satisfied by its proof of some damage flowing from the unlawful conspiracy; inquiry
beyond this minimum point goes only to the amount and not the fact of damage. It is
enough that the illegality is shown to be a material cause of the injury; a plaintiff
need not exhaust all possible alternative sources of injury in fulfilling his burden of
proving compensable injury under § 4.
Id at 114 n.9 (citing Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 702
(1962); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1968)
(concurring opinion)). Thus, the distinction between proof of fact of damage and amount of
damages is specially significant in a case in which the plaintiffs injury results from several
factors, not all of which contribute to defendant's liability. In Terrell v. Household Goods
Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 987 (1974), the court stated that
a fair degree of certainty was sufficient to establish that the illegal conduct naturally contributed to the injury. Id at 20. The court recognized that several factors may contribute to the
plaintiffs injury, but concluded,
Even if the overall effect be susceptible of reasonably certain measure, it may simply
be impossible to identify the quantum attributable to each of the separate strands of
cause. This is not to say that the plaintiff may be relieved of his burden of proving
the amount of damages, but only that his burden should not be increased by a load
he has already successfully shouldered.
Id at 22. Cf.McCaskill v. Texaco, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D. Ala. 1972) (competitive
injury treated as the requisite causal connection between the price discrimination and the injury to plaintiffs business or property); Secatore's Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 171 F. Supp.
665 (D. Mass. 1959) (potential loss of profit afforded no basis for recovery without competitive
injury). See also NBO Indus. Treadway Cos. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. grantedsubnom. Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), rev'g, 364
F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1973); cf.Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 523 F.2d 961
(6th Cir. 1975) (damage assessment that produced no net recovery).
77. The gist of the private antitrust action is the allegation of facts from which an inference may be drawn that the violation caused plaintiff direct injury to his business or property.
Duff v. Kansas Star Co., 299 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir. 1962). See also Herman Schwabe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 909-10 (2d Cir. 1962); American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191 F.2d 38, 54 (8th Cir. 1951); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil Co.,
187 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).

damage action.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act, the treble damage remedy, provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business or

property by reason of anything in the antitrust laws may sue therefor." Read literally, this language would award treble damages and

reasonable attorney's fees to any complainant who could definitively
establish that an antitrust violation even remotely caused injury to
his business or property.
preted this section.7 9

8

Courts have not, however, literally inter-

The liability issue of a section 2(a) claim is not always treated as
separable from the damages issue of a section 4 claim.80 The reason
is that no clear distinction exists between the issue of liability and
that of damages. 8 Courts often refer to the causation element of a
section 4 cause of action as the fact of legal injury.8 2 Moreover,

damages are often assessed in connection with the rationale for
liability.
Courts that have treated the liability and damages issues as separate, however, distinguish between the quantum of proof required
to establish the fact of legal injury and that required for the amount
of damages. 83 The fact of damage must be established with cer78. The Supreme Court has warned that courts should not add requirements that burden
private litigants in addition to those requirements specifically set out in the statute. Radovich
v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 454 (1957). Courts have, however, warned against
enlarging the remedy by construction. See, e.g., Image & Sound Serv. Corp. v. Altec Serv.
Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1956); Westor Theatres v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
41 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D.N.J. 1941); Pollock, Standing, supra note 39, at 8. See generally Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 n. 14 (1973); Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co.,
534 F.2d 1172, 1174 (5th Cir. 1976); Blank v. Preventive Health Programs, 504 F. Supp. 416,
419 (S.D. Ga. 1980).
79. Section 4 of the Clayton Act has produced a "mass of litigation and a metaphysics
almost as intricate as the metaphysics of the Robinson-Patman Act." Pollock, Injury and Causation, supra note 46, at 343. See Timberlake, supra note 6. This litigation has ensued by
virtue of the phrase "by reason of' because it poses causation problems unique to antitrust
law. The principle of causation appropriate in personal injury cases does not apply in an
interdependent economy. Also, the treble damage remedy does not lend itself to a separation
of remedial compensation and punishment functions as does the tort damage award.
80. Proof of the competitive injury will be interwoven with proof of the quantum of
damages. Banana Distrib. v. United Fruit Co., 162 F. Supp. 32, 45 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 596 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1959). See Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.
198 1). The trial court must therefore exhibit caution but flexibility in rulings on admissibility
of evidence in a bifurcated trial. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d
1307, 1324 (5th Cir. 1976). But ef. Knutson v. Daily Review, 383 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (N.D.
Cal. 1974).
81. This interrelation causes confusion and leads to treble damage awards, as well as
injunctive relief, in situations in which there is merely the potential of harm to competition.
See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573
F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1978); Fowler Mfg. Co. v. Gorlick, 415 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1969).
82. See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1314
n.7 (5th Cir. 1976).
83. An often-quoted statement made by the Supreme Court in Story Parchment Co. v.
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931), explains this difference in proof.
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there was none
as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof
necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the

tainty; the precise amount of damages may remain speculative.8 4
Accordingly, plaintifis failure to prove precisely the critical competitive injury element will preclude him from proving his pecuniary
harm, even though he may have inadvertently established that the
85
price discrimination has caused injury to his business or property.
Failure to recognize this distinction between fact of damage and
amount of damages hinders the ability of the Robinson-Patman Act
to effectuate antitrust policy.8 6 Without this distinction between section 2(a)'s competitive injury and section 4's injury to one's business
or property, the risk of a per se application of the price discrimination laws increases dramatically. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's latest attempt in Payne to etch the rule of competitive injury
in a price discrimination case does not make explicit the burdens of
proof that highlight the distinction between the fact of damage and
the amount of damages. A conceptual understanding of this distinction and a practicable application of these concepts is the only means
measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount. The rule which
precludes the recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain
result of the wrong, not to those damages which are definitely attributable to the
wrong and only uncertain in respect to their amount.
Id at 562. The Court's reference to damages that are "not the certain result of the wrong"
clearly refers to the fact of legal injury. Timberlake, supra note 6, at 237. See Terrell v.
Household Goods Carriers' Bureau, 494 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 987 (1974);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1969); Triangle Conduit & Cable
Co. v. National Elec. Prods. Corp., 152 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1945); Cameron Iron Works Inc. v.
Edward Valves, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Tex. 1959), af'd, 286 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1961).
One court has interpreted the Supreme Court's articulation of the dichotomy of damage
proof as follows:
[P]laintiff is required to establish with reasonable probability the existence of some
causal connection between defendant's wrongful act and some loss of anticipated
revenue. Once that has been accomplished, the jury will be permitted to "make a just
and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant data, and render its verdict
accordingly.". . . The cases have drawn a distinction between the quantum of proof
necessary to show thefact as distinguished from the amount of damage; the burden
as to the former is the more stringent one. In other words, thefact of injury must first
be shown before the jury is allowed to estimate the amount of damage.
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir. 1957) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
84. Practicality warrants a less exacting requirement of proof regarding the amount of
damages. Comment, ProofandMeasurement, supra note 48, at 1113. Juries can rely on probable and inferential as well as more direct and positive proof. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,
282 U.S. 555, 561-64 (1931)). Courts will not accept uncertainty, speculation, or guesswork in
a damage award. Nonetheless, if the public function of private litigation is not to be frustrated, courts should not demand unduly rigorous proof of the plaintiffs' damage. Areeda,
Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1976) [herein-

after cited as Areeda].
85. See Areeda, supra note 84, at 1136-38.
86. The distinction between the two phases, liability and damages, should nonetheless be
recognized to preserve their qualitative differences. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392
(9th Cir. 1957); Comment, ProofandMeasurement, supra note 48, at 1114. The application of
this distinction should be changed conceptually to best effectuate the goals of antitrust policy.
A procedural-substantive distinction rather than two substantive issues of causation would
solve much of the problem.

of effective enforcement of the price discrimination law as it now
exists.
C

The Economics of Competitive Injury

Because legal analysis is not in itself sufficient in an antitrust
context, 7 courts also analyze competitive injury at the affected level
of distribution.
1.

Primary-lineCompetitive Injury.-The

primary-line of com-

petitive injury, or the seller level competitive injury, focuses on competition between a discriminating seller and its rivals selling
functionally equivalent goods. 88 The concept of primary-line competition, which is rooted in that proviso of the original Clayton Act
that refers to persons who grant a discriminatory price, seeks to protect competitors of the discriminatory seller. Consequently, to effectuate the Act's purpose in these cases, the plaintiff must first allege,
and then prove, that he was competing with the defendant.89
87. The competitive injury may also be viewed in a theoretical framework. The statutory
language of the Robinson-Patman Act involves two conceptually different injuries. C. EDWARDS, supra note 21, at 518-24. The first, the broad concept "where the effect may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly," refers to a spectrum of possibilities, ranging from the efficiencies in a perfectly competitive market to complete control by
a monopoly. This concept, originally in the Clayton Act, generally concerns market competition and its effects. It is invoked to prevent damage to competition resulting from predatory
practices by potential monopolists, i.e., to prevent injury to competition similar in kind although not in degree to the focus of antitrust policy generally.
The second type of injury, the narrow concept "where the effect ... may b6 to substantially . . . injure, destroy, or prevent competition," is peculiar to the Robinson-Patman
amendments. This concept focuses on the impact of seller's practices on others and their effects on particular groups within the market. It is invoked even in situations in which no
injury results from predatory practices. It seeks to prevent price discrimination from becoming
a method of depriving disfavored buyers of opportunities in resale markets, whether or not the
price discrimination affects those resale markets.
The broad-narrow distinction has been largely ignored because that perspective has, in
theory, proved impracticable. Murray, supra note 2, at 626-27 n. 17. Moreover, the FTC has
discerned no practical difference in the various approaches. See In re Purex Corp., 51 FTC
100, 116 (1954). The doctrinal differentiation among these categories of competitive effect has
proven inconsequential. F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 125. See F.T.C. v. Borden Co., 339 F.2d
133 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 383 U.S. 637 (1966), on remand, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967), for an
example of how this theory is applied.
88. A primary-line injury occurs if the supplier lowers its prices to a competitor's customer at the same time that it sells at higher prices to its own customers in the same market
area. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. F.T.C., 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969); E.B. Muller &
Co. v. F.T.C., 142 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1944). Note that the like grade and quality requirement is
distinct from the saleability or functionally equivalent requirement in a primary-line case.
Callaway Mills Co. v. F.T.C., 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966); Bolick-Gillman Co. v. Continental
Baking Co., 206 F. Supp. 151 (D. Nev. 1961); McWhirter v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 76
F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Mo. 1948). See F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
89. The Act does not distinguish among lines of competitive injury for purposes of proof
of the fact of legal injury. Primary-line cases do, however, involve different considerations
than secondary- and tertiary-line cases and accordingly, these situations warrant separate
treatment. Elias, supra note 1, at 701; Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line In ury Under the
Robinson-PatmanAct: The Concept of "Competitive Advantage, " 44 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 48,
53-54 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gifford]. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston
Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1922); In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 FTC 232, 331 (1936).

Commission attempts to devise standards for primary-line competitive injury have so far proved fruitless. Courts and the FTC
have relied instead on extensive market analyses by economists to
substantiate their findings of anticompetitive practices. This economic inquiry seeks to determine whether the price differential has
caused a substantial market dislocation. But, while diversion of
business is relevant to competitive injury, it is not its legal
equivalent.9" Proof of predatory pricing sometimes suffices to prove
the requisite competitive effect, 9 especially if direct evidence of
predatory intent exists.92 In these cases, the fact of injury is the intent to lessen competition and is easily separable from the extent of
injury.93 Accordingly, courts and the FTC have easily distinguished
between procompetitive and anticompetitive pricing.
Utah Pie Co. v. ContinentalBaking Co.94 best illustrates a predatory practice at the primary level. In that case, a family operation
sued its three national competitors in the frozen pie market alleging
predatory practices in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a verdict for the plaintiff on the price
discrimination charge on the ground that the evidence insufficiently
supported a finding of possible injury to competition.9 5 The
90. International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 721 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 521 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). See
Dixon, PracticeandProcedureBefore the FederalTrade Commission, 9 N.Y.L.F. 31, 36 (1963)
(quoted in International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 722 n.12 (5th
Cir. 1975)). See also National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. F.T.C., 412 F.2d 605, 624 (7th Cir. 1969).
91. The possibility of predatory intent cuts across all levels of injury although suspicion
of it is seldom factually articulated. See generally 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d
340 (3d Cir. 1981); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
92. Direct evidence is not essential; courts have inferred predatory intent from belowcost and other seller activities. See Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d
790, 798 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). See International Air Indus. Inc. v.
American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975); ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 16, at 75.
See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. F.T.C., 289 F.2d 835, 843 (1961), on remandfrom, 363 U.S.
536 (1960).
93. "[K]nowledge of actual intent is an aid in the interpretation of facts and prediction of
consequences." Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 696 n. 12 (1967) (quoting Appalachian Coal, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 372 (1933)). Predato.-y pricing
creates an inference of wilful intent to substantially lessen, injure, destroy, or prevent competition. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. F.T.C., 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961), on remandfrom, 363 U.S.
563 (1960). See Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 120 (1954); Atlas Bldg. Prods.
Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960);
Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 269 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
991 (1956). "Judicial use of the term 'predatory intent' is, however, troublesome." International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 722 (5th Cir. 1975). Courts
have equated predatory pricing with the sacrifice of present revenues for the purpose of driving
a competitor out of the market. The predator then recoups losses through subsequent higher
prices. Id at 723. See Areeda & Turner, infra notes 99-100.
94. 386 U.S. 685 (1967). See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981); Brodley & Hay, PredatoryPricing- CompetingEconomic
Theories and the Evolution ofLegal Standards, 66 CORN. L. REV. 738 (1981).
95. 386 U.S. at 702-03.

Supreme Court reversed. In its view, the jury could have rationally
attributed a declining price structure to continued or sporadic price
discrimination.96 The Court identified below-cost sales by each of
the defendants to support its findings of predatory pricing, which, in
turn, supported an inference of competitive injury.9 7 It noted that

the Act is not limited to circumstances in which a defendant's discriminatory prices consistently undercut all other competitors.

Rather, blatant predatory price discrimination aimed only at a single
competitor, as well as price discriminations that erode competition
generally, constitutes competitive injury within the proscription of
the Act, despite the absence of damages to a single competitor. 98
Decisions of the last decade reflect a concerted effort to apply

economic analysis to primary-line cases. Two prominent antitrust
attorneys, Areeda and Turner, formulated a "meaningful and workable" competitive injury test in 1975 by distinguishing between pred-

atory and competitive pricing. 99 They proposed that courts interpret
the Robinson-Patman Act to permit a monopolist to discriminate in
pricing if his lower price equals or exceeds his marginal cost. They
argued that any simpler test would result in an anticompetitive ap-

plication of the Robinson-Patman Act."° This approach reflects an
earnest attempt by commentators to reconcile the goals of price discrimination law with antitrust directives.
An economic approach is advantageous in price discrimination
cases, especially because inimical competitive effects are not solely

caused by the discriminatory price. The effects can also result from a
supplier's superior marketing techniques or its rivals' internal
problems. 0 1 Ultimately, the test is whether the Commission or the

private litigant can show reasonable possibility of injury to competition. This test hinges on evidence in the record from which a jury
could conclude that a violation of the Act caused that primary-line
96. Id The Court in Utah Pie reasoned that there can be a reasonable possibility of
injury to competition in a market, despite a steady increase in the volume of sales and competitors' continued ability to operate profitably. Id
97. Id at 702-03. Judicial concepts of "predatory intent" and "below-cost" pricing have
not escaped criticism. Courts and task forces have charged that these concepts are inadequate
to serve as criteria for identifying anticompetitive pricing conduct. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co.
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 795-96 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Telex
'Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); NEAL
REP., supra note 3, at App. ID-201.
98. Utah Pie, 386 U.S. at 702-03. Absence of an amount of damages does not preclude a
competitive injury. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
99. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Areeda & Turner]. See Wall
St. J., July 14, 1982, at 52, col. 1.
100. Areeda & Turner, supra note 99, at 726-28. The basic substantive issues raised by the
Robinson-Patman Act's concern with primary-line injury of competition are identical to those
raised by the Sherman Act's concern with predatory pricing. Id
101. E. KINTNER, supra note 5, at 140.

injury to competition.

°2

2. Secondary-line Competitive Injury.-Congress explicitly
designed the Robinson-Patman amendments to prohibit competitive
harm at the secondary, or buyer, level." 3 Secondary-line injury frequently arises when a vendor offers volume discounts to large purchasers at unit prices lower than those offered to smaller purchasers.
The favored firm has the option to resell the goods more cheaply
than their smaller competitors who have paid higher unit prices. It is
this type of advantage that the Robinson-Patman amendments were
designed to prohibit." 4
Under the competitive injury language, courts originally barred
price discrimination if it caused a significant material or undue lessening of competition. The Supreme Court has stated that the Act
seeks to prohibit price discriminations "in their incipiency before
harm to competition is effected."' 0 5 Following this lead, the FTC
has assimilated the new competitive injury language of the Robinson-Patman amendments into its original interpretation of the Clayton Act." ° Accordingly, Commission decisions between 1936 and
1945 clearly indicate not only that the FTC recognizes competitive
effect as an element in a Robinson-Patman violation, but also that
the burden of proof rests on the FTC to adduce affirmative evidence
102. Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29, 35 (7th Cir. 1976);
Shore Gas & Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 224 F. Supp. 922, 925-26 (D.N.J. 1963).
103. The Robinson-Patman amendments dispensed with the need for the exhaustive market analysis demanded by the Clayton Act. Congress extended legal protection to competition
between viable individual competitors in addition to the competition in a certain market. See
supra notes 31-33 and 87. This shift in focus eased the burden of proving competitive injury
since complainants could show the adverse competitive effects among competitors as opposed
to the market in general. See F.T.C. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954). See also George Van Camp & Sons Co. v.
American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245 (1929) (first case to recognize that original § 2(a) language
should extend to buyer-line injury).
104. Gifford, supra note 89, at 53. Typically, in these cases, the unit prices of the goods
decline in proportion to the quantity purchased over a particular time period. The quantity of
goods in an individual purchase order may be irrelevant to unit production and delivery costs
even though it may bear a relation to total delivery costs. Findings of adverse effects often
result from the advantage that large firms paying lower supply prices have over competing
smaller firms. Id. at 54.
105. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. F.T.C., 324 U.S. 726 (1945). See also United Biscuit Co. of
Am. v. F.T.C., 350 F.2d 615, 620 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926 (1966); Purolator
Prods., Inc. v. F.T.C., 352 F.2d 874, 881 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968); E.
Edelmann & Co. v. F.T.C., 239 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 941 (1958);
National Lead Co. v. F.T.C., 227 F.2d 825, 835 (1955), rev'd, 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
106. The Commission's pleadings typically included charges to all competitive injury possibilities including allegations that there was a substantial lessening of competition; a tendency
to monopolize; or an injury, destruction, or prevention of competition below the primary
levels. Austern, supra note 35, at 68. Accordingly, the complaints varied widely to support
these allegations since different evidence supports each. See In re Vonnegut Hardware Co., 32
FTC 512, 513 (1941) (the word "substantially" read to modify the language added in 1936): In
re Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 25 FTC 537, 544 (1937) (the quantity discount did "not appear
to inflict any perceptible injury upon those who did not receive it").

of competitive injury. 0 7
In 1945, the Second Circuit in Samuel H Moss, Inc. v. FTC't 8

introduced into Robinson-Patman law a novel doctrine involving the
prima facie case of a price discrimination under section 2(a). The
court of appeals interpreted this provision as relieving the FTC from
proving actual injury and allowing a defense of lack of competitive
injury to justify a price discrimination."t 9 In the aftermath of the

Moss decision, much controversy has centered around the requisite
burden to prove a competitive injury." 0
While the FTC ultimately abandoned the Moss doctrine in In re
General Foods Corp., "'tin the interim the Supreme Court decided
FTC v. Morton Salt Co. 1t2 Morton Salt, a secondary-line case, involved a seller who offered volume discounts that were theoretically,
although not effectively, available to all buyers. The Court concluded that a reasonable possibility that the price discrimination
may have injured competition is sufficient to bar discriminatory
prices.' '3 Because the respondent was appealing a cease and desist
order, the Court avoided investigation of injury to any individual
competitor; a competitive injury alone sufficiently justified a sanction. The Morton Salt decision has been interpreted as endorsing an
inference of injury as applied to systematic and sustained secondaryline price discrimination. "4 But its apparent approval of the Moss
107. F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 108. Findings of liability generally coincided with the
demonstration of adverse market effects. ATT'Y GEN. REP., supra note 3, at 161.
108. 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945).
109. Id at 379. The Moss decision was initially interpreted to utilize the meeting competition defense as a device that shifts the burden of proof to anyone who sets two prices. ATr'y
GEN. REP.,supra note 3, at 161. The doctrine articulated in Moss was subsequently referred to
as the presumptive doctrine. Id Although the Second Circuit reiterated the doctrine in F.T.C.
v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189 F.2d 510, 515 (2d Cir. 1951), other courts immediately receded
from it even prior to the FTC's decision in In re General Foods Corp., 50 FTC 885 (1954).
Mead's Fine Bread Co. v. Moore, 208 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 348
U.S. 115 (1959). See Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. F.T.C., 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 118
F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), prob. juris. noted, 348 U.S. 806 (1959).
110. Subsequent reviews of the Moss doctrine allege that the court misread the pleadings
and misinterpreted Commission practice. "On any grammatical reading of the text of the Act,
this constitutes unwarranted judicial rewriting of both Section [3(a) and 3(b)]." Austern, supra
note 35, at 72. The circuit court effectively created a "rebuttable presumption without a logical
core." Id at 73. See F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 110 n.82.
111. 50 FTC 885 (1954). See Austern, supra note 35, at 73-77.
112. 334 U.S. 37 (1948). See Murray, supra note 2, at 642.
113. Morton Salt, 334 U.S. at 46-47. Courts have not always distinguished between "possibility" and "probability." International Air Indus., Co. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d
714, 728 (5th Cir. 1975). This vacillation between the standards leads to the conclusion that
the distinction between the words is "an empty quibble without operational significance." Id
at 728-29 (quoting F. RowE, supra note 2, at 136). Compare Standard Motor Prods., Inc. v.
F.T.C., 265 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959) (favoring substantially
probable) with Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 952 (10th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960) (favoring reasonable possibility).
114. The discrimination must be significant relative to profit margins, and competition
among resellers must be keen. See Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. F.T.C., 348 F.2d 674, 678-80 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); E. Edelmann & Co. v. F.T.C., 239 F.2d 152, 154 (7th

doctrine in the wake of controversy surrounding Moss has left the

competitive injury requirement amid confusion as evidenced by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in J Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp. "15

3. Beyond the Secondary-Line.-Beyond

the secondary level

of injury, the courts have been unable to identify explicit language in
the Robinson-Patman Act to support a prohibition against the more
remote competitive injuries. Nevertheless, if price discrimination
suffered by a buyer places his customers in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis customers of a more favored buyer, courts and the
FTC will recognize a third-line competitive injury." 16
In Perkins v. Standard Oil of California,I" the Supreme Court
extended section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act beyond the third
line. Perkins illustrates the typical market arrangement that gives
rise to a fourth-line competitive injury. In this case, Standard Oil
sold gasoline to Perkins at higher prices than it sold to other wholesalers. One of these wholesalers marketed the gasoline to another

who, in turn, passed the discount on to a retailer. Perkins also, however, operated at the retail level. In its suit against Standard Oil,

Perkins alleged a violation of section 2(a), arguing that it was unable
to effectively compete with other retailers due to the discriminatory

pricing practice in the sale of gasoline to its wholesalers.
The Court in Perkins held that no functional level limitation
Cir. 1956). See also Elgin Corp. v. Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co., 251 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1958) (jury
instructions that describe the imposition of a burden on the plaintiff to offer evidence from
which to draw a logical inference that price discrimination has competitive effect). The inference has been interpreted in a variety of ways.
While the bare existence of price differentials does not compel an inference of a substantial lessening of competition, the cases go far in that direction. For example, a
"substantial" price differential sufficient to "influence retail prices" has been held
quite adequate. . . and a price differential without more but in the context of keen
competition and tight profit margins furnishes sufficient basis for a conclusion that
the requirements of Section 2(a) are present. . . . Indeed, this Circuit has gone even
further holding that "any substantial, sustained [price] differential between competing resellers isprirafacie injurious."
Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 466 F.2d 1163, 1174 (7th Cir. 1972)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 16, at 99.
115. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
116. Standard Oil Co. v. F.T.C., 340 U.S. 231 (1951). The Standard Oil case although
primarily a decision on the meeting competition defense, represents the only third-line injury
case to survive attack. E. KINTNER, supra note 5, at 165. The third-line injury requires that
unless an individual actually purchases from the person charged with the discrimination, he
has no cause of action. Injury to competition between customers of purchasers arises in a
variety of contexts including situations in which the vendor gives the wholesaler, and not the
retailer, a functional discount large enough to allow him to pass it on to the wholesaler's retail
customers, or situations in which the retailer who buys directly from the supplier benefits to
the extent that he can undercut the wholesaler. See Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.
1956); Krug v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1956). Because thirdline injury enforcement has infrequently occurred, an analysis would be somewhat speculative.
E. KINTNER, supra note 6, at 164-68.

117.

Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).

existed in the original section 2(a) standard of illegality that should
be carried into the present statute.'l 8 It did not accept a limitation of

liability on the distribution line. Rather, the existence of a competitive injury turned on whether there was sufficient evidence to support an inference of causation." 9 Thus, in Perkins, the Court

transformed the Robinson-Patman competitive injury into a causation requirement by eliminating the level limitation on cognizable

competitive injury. Its reference to an artificial limitation 120 is a caveat to guard against arbitrary decisions demarcating the remoteness

of an injury. This reference also suggests that competitive injury is
essentially a deceptive label given to legal injury and causation.
IV. A Proposal: Standing as a Practical Competitive Injury
The competitive injury/recoverable injury distinction and the
resultant controversy over the question of proof of each is unique to
Robinson-Patman actions. But the prescriptive and remedial approach of the section 2(a) price discrimination prohibition of the
Robinson-Patman Act substantially resembles that of the merger
prohibition of section 7 of the Clayton Act.' 2 ' This similarity sug118. Id at 646-48.
119. Id at 648-49. The Court in Perkins stated as follows:
Before an injured party can recover damages under the Act, he must, of course,
be able to show a causal connection between the price discrimination in violation of
the Act and the injury suffered. This is true regardless of the "level" in the chain of
distribution on which the injury occurs. The court below held that, as a matter of
law, "Section 2(a) of the Act does not recognize a causal connection, essential to
liability, between a supplier's price discrimination and the trade practices of a customer as far removed on the distributive ladder as Regal was from Standard." 396
F.2d, at 816. As we have noted above, we do not accept such an artificial limitation.
If there is sufficient evidence in the record to support an inference of causation, the
ultimate conclusion as to what that evidence proves is for the jury.
Id
120. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
121. Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
or any part of the stock or other share capital. . . or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect osuch acquisition may be substantiallyto lessen competition,
or tend to create a monopoly.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (emphasis added) (as amended by the CellerKefauver Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)). The original § 7 language of the Clayton Act was intended to prohibit stock and holding company acquisitions
that exceeded the reach of the Sherman Act. The amended language was expressly intended to
apply to all types of mergers and acquisitions that threatened a reasonable probability of substantially lessening competition or tending toward monopoly. Turner, ConglomerateMergers
and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1313-15 (1965); ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 7, MERGER STANDARDS UNDER U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS (1981).

The following factors are relevant to the competitive effect of a merger: degree of concentration in a particular market; barriers to entry; vigor of price competition and supply and demand conditions in that particular market; relationship between size and competitive
compatability in that market; intentions and past practices of acquiring power; countervailing
economic power of third parties in the relevant market; and alternatives available to the acquiring entity. This list is not exhaustive. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
410 U.S. 526 (1973); F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Pabst Brewing Co.
v. United States, 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966);

gests that private litigation of these two antitrust violations should be
procedurally identical because the remedial provisions of the Clayton Act apply to all antitrust laws.' 22 Curiously, the competitive injury/recoverable injury distinction poses problems only in price
discrimination cases. In merger cases, courts impose standing to sue
as a preliminary requirement, and thus avoid some injury
23

confusion. 1

Standing to sue is a necessary element to maintain an antitrust
suit. 124 To establish standing, the plaintiff must show that he has
suffered legal injury. Thus, courts reformulate competitive injury as
an inquiry into whether the injury to plaintiffs business or property
would serve as the basis for an antitrust suit. 25 This analysis, although required by section 4 of26the Clayton Act, is generally omitted
in Robinson-Patman actions.
In the early years of the Clayton Act, courts disallowed treble
damage recoveries for section 7 violations on the ground that private
litigants had no standing to recover damages. 27 Because Congress
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. E.1. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
122. The term "antitrust laws" is defined in § I of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976).
123. Compare Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) with
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
124. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 1, MERGERS AND THE PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUIT: THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION VII OF THE CLAYTON ACT POLICY
AND LAW 8-10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA MONOGRAPH, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT]. Two

issues peculiar to standing to sue are whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged activity
has caused him injury in fact and whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant arguably falls within the intended zone of protected interests. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Standing to sue is not merely a collection of
technical rules and doctrines, but a device by which a court determines whether the plaintiff is
entitled to judicial protection. Because the chain of causation extends indefinitely, the real
problem is determining the point at which the chain should be severed. Pollock, Standing,
supra note 39, at 9. But standing issues are usually presented by virtue of a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Because standing to sue accordingly becomes a procedural issue, the sufficiency of the claim of injury is judged by the court.
Beane, Antitrust.- Standing and Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 331, 332 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Beane].
125. The question of which persons have sustained injury for purposes of § 4 of the Clayton Act is analytically distinct from the question of which persons have sustained injury for
purposes of standing to sue for damages under § 4. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,
728 n.7 (1977). See Handler & Blechman, Antitrust and Consumer Interests.- The Fallacy of
Parens Patriaeand .4 Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 644-45 (1976). See also
Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973). Con-

gress intended to distinguish those persons permitted to bring a private treble damage suit
from those not permitted to do so. Although the statute is broadly worded, it does not grant
access to litigants interested merely in enforcing the antitrust laws on behalf of the public.
Rather, it limits treble damage suits to the real party in interest who has been injured by a
violation. This definition comports with the minimum requirements of Article III of the Constitution, ie., injury in fact.
126. See, e.g., Payne, 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
127. ABA MONOGRAPH, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 124, at 8. The standing to
sue requirement for treble damage suits antedates the enactment of the Clayton Act. See Loeb
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910); Ames v. American Tel. & Tel., 166 F. 820
(D. Mass. 1909); Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots.- Complications and Conflicts on
Standing to Sue and Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 351,

designed section 7 to prohibit future monopolistic and restraining
tendencies of corporate acquisitions, private litigants were not peran anticipated but unrealized invasion
mitted to recover damages for
1 28

of their economic interests.

In the late 1960s, however, courts began to infer the treble damage remedy from the Supreme Court decision in Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. 129 By 1977,
the Court expressly approved this interpretation of Minnesota Mining. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 130 the Court

held that a private party alleging a violation of the merger prohibition may recover treble damages. In order to recover, however, a

private litigant must prove more than a mere injury causally linked
to a violation; he must prove13 1"an injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent."'
Until very recently, the Supreme Court has offered little guidance on the competitive injury issue and its relation to standing to
sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act.' 3 2 The circuit courts, on the
other hand, have construed the phrase "by reason of' in section 4 as
352 n.4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Klingsberg]. See also Bailey's Baking, Ltd. v. Continental
Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 717 (D. Hawaii 1964); ABA MONOGRAPH, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 124, at 8.

128. The decisions reflected a concern that the treble damage remedy would be unduly
harsh in a merger context absent the requirement of proof of predatory intent or conduct.
Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705, 717 (D. Hawaii 1964); ABA
MONOGRAPH, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT, supra note 124, at 8. See Highland Supply Corp. v.

Reynolds Metals Co., 327 F.2d 725, 728 n.3 (8th Cir. 1964) and cases cited therein. See also
Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 673 (9th Cir. 1963);
American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
129. 381 U.S. 311 (1965). See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 414 F.2d 959, 960-61
(2d Cir. 1969); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F. Supp. 72, 86 (D. Hawaii 1969). See also
Carlson Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 507 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1974); Zenith Vinyl
Fabrics Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 357 F. Supp. 133, 136 (E.D. Mich. 1973), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 967 (1974).
130. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
131. Id at 480. Because the protection of the public was of primary importance to effectuate the purpose of the antitrust laws, the Court reasoned that the private right of action was
subordinate to the public right of action. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429
U.S. 477 (1977), the Court stated,
We therefore hold that for plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7
violations, they must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in
the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either
of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.
Id at 489 (emphasis in original).
132. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982) (factors to determine
whether a particular injury is too remote from the alleged violation to warrant § 4 standing
include (I) physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and harm to the plaintiff and (2) more particularly, the relationship of the alleged injury to the type of injury for
which Congress designed a private remedy). Taken together, Payne, Brunswick, and McCready might be interpreted as the Supreme Court's position on standing to sue in an antitrust
context. See Comment, Standing Under Clayton § 4: A Proverbial Mystery, 77 DICK. L. REV.
73 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Standing]. See also Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp.,
521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).

a standing issue based on competitive injury. 33 By inferring fact of
damage as well as presence of legal causation, these circuit courts
grant standing to sue. 34 The legal causation requirement is both the
section 2(a) competitive injury requirement and the section 4 standing requirement. 35 Like the proximate cause issue in tort law, the
existence of legal causation restricts the scope of a defendant's liability and a plaintiffs right to recover. 36 Standing to sue in a private
antitrust action simply resolves how best to deal with the issue of
legal causation. 137
133. Disagreement in the circuit courts over what constitutes a sufficiently direct causal
connection between the plaintiff's alleged injury and the defendant's purportedly unlawful
activities prompted an interpretation of the phrase "by reason of" in § 4 as an antitrust standing requirement. See Reading Indus. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 631 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981). The disagreements concern two competing theories of standing, the "direct injury" test and the "target area" test.
The "direct injury" test, first articulated under § 4's predecessor to the Sherman Act in
Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910), is based on the relationship between
the claimant and the alleged antitrust violator. Beane, supra note 124, at 233. If causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the competitive injury can be established, plaintill's injury will be considered the direct result of the violation and he will be granted standing
to sue. The law of antitrust standing is merely an elaboration of the direct injury test. Berger
& Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 913 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Berger & Bernstein]. See SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 407 F.2d
166 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 943 (1969). See generaly Beane, supra note 124; Comment, Standing, supra note 132, at 76-80.
The inflexibility of the direct injury rule led to the development of elaboration of this test.
Berger & Bernstein, supra at 813. Some courts have used the "categorization" approach in
drawing analogies to plaintiffs in certain early cases which held that various categories of litigants had standing or lacked it. Id at 820. Others have applied the "target area" test to
expand the class of persons deserving protection. If a private litigant could establish that he
was within the area of the economy affected by the violation, he was granted standing to sue.
Those harmed only incidentally by antitrust violations do not have standing to sue; those at
whom the violation is aimed directly or who have been harmed directly have standing to sue.
Id But the direct injury rule, whether implementing the categorization approach or target
test, is impracticable. The courts have expressed their dissatisfaction with the current state of
the law. Id at 840 n.141. While the Supreme Court decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.
431 U.S. 720 (1977), is a decisive step toward the formulation of a coherent analytical framework for antitrust standing, it is limited in its application. Id. Courts need a fresh approach to
antitrust standing, one that is applicable to almost all antitrust violations.
134. Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 923 (1971); Comment, Standing, supra note 132, at 89. The plaintiff carries the burden of
proof of causation. Atlas Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Diamond Block & Gravel Co., 269 F.2d 950, 95758 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960); Sano Petroleum Corp. v. American Oil
Co., 187 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
Evidence of a substantial discrimination compared to plaintiff's operating costs, Richfield
Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 712-13 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961
(1960), especially if coupled with consumer testimony of diversion of business, persuasively
proves causation. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763, 768-69 (7th Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 899 (1931).
135. Comment, Standing, supra note 132, at 89 n.123.
136. GAF Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., 463 F.2d 752, 759 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 413
U.S. 901 (1973). Standing arises in connection with liability and thus has no bearing on the
postponed issue of damages awarded under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Harrison v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 312, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1953), aff'd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 828 (1954).
137. The absence of a coherent analytical framework for antitrust standing stems from
several factors. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 133, at 841-44. First, while Congress clearly
intended to use private self-interest as a means of enforcement and to arm injured persons with
a private measure, Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947), it pro-

As a standing issue, competitive injury emerges as a prerequisite
to a section 4 cause of action.' 38 The private litigant pleads with
specificity and particularity the manner, nature, character, and extent of his injury as well as the facts from which the injury resulted
and those showing the effect of the alleged violation. 39 Factual allegations in the complaint, if proved, must satisfy the injury and causation requirements of section 2(a). Moreover, plaintiffs injury must
be a violation of a legal right different from that which he suffers as a
member of the general public."4 Thus, the focus is on the type of
injury pleaded and its relationship to the alleged anticompetitive effect. By including competitive injury as part of a determination of
standing to sue, the courts effectively restrict the scope of section 4 at
vided no guidance concerning the appropriate balance between the aims of compensation and
deterrence and the existence of competing policies. The courts were forced to adopt a legalistic
approach. The Supreme Court has thus far failed to fill in the gaps left by Congress. Second,
courts confuse antitrust standing with an inquiry into the merits of a claim for relief. Finally,
the current law is inherently unworkable. None of the judicially created tests have proved
effective for purposes of§ 4 of the Clayton Act. Berger & Bernstein, supra note 133, at 841-44.
See also Comment, Standing, supra note 132.

138. Plaintiff is subject to summary judgment or a pretrial motion for dismissal if he cannot meet the threshold requirement of standing to sue. Pollock, Injury and Causation, supra
note 46, at 342.
139. Comment, Treble Damages, supra note 39, at 574. See Beegle v. Thomson, 138 F.2d
875, 881 (7th Cir. 1943). Although the exclusionary rules of evidence are typically relaxed in
administrative proceedings, counsel in support of a Robinson-Patman complaint must nevertheless prove "any statutory violation by the preponderance of material and reliable evidence
on the record as a whole." F. ROWE, supra note 2, at 499. See F.T.C. v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948); 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.12 (1958).
140. Comment, Treble Damages, supra note 39, at 573-74. The issues of standing to sue
and antitrust injury are distinguishable. Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An
Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 999 (1977). The standing

issue is a policy determination made by the courts only after they have decided whether the
injury suffered is of the type meant to be protected by the antitrust laws. Calderone Entr.
Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, 454 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 930 (1972). The standing to sue issue goes to the competitive injury whereas the antitrust
injury issue goes to the treble damage recovery. But cf.Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643
F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981). Accord John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495,
498-99 (9th Cir. 1977) (Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat., Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977),
interpreted to mean that pleading of antitrust injury is an essential component of standing to
sue under § 4 of the Clayton Act).
The standing to sue and antitrust injury issues remain, however, confused. An example of
that confusion follows in Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency.- An Approach to
Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 467, 497 (1980):

Antitrust injury is a rule of standing in the broad sense insofar as it defines the
type of harm that is compensable; all of those plaintiffs who have not suffered this
kind of harm necessarily lack standing to sue. The antitrust standing doctrine, however, narrows the class of those who may recover for antitrust injury. Within this
scheme, antitrust injury defines that level of damages appropriate for carrying out the
deterrent function. The rules of standing reinforce the deterrent function by preventing multiple recoveries or excessively complex or numerous lawsuits; the goal of deterrence would be just as certainly undermined by duplicative recoveries as it would
be by recoveries for harms unrelated to the inefficiency caused by the violation. A
damage award unrelated to the size of the injury increases the total social cost of
antitrust enforcement.
Id at 497. This discussion appears to fail to distinguish properly between fact of damage and
amount of damages. Cf. Comment, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.: Injury and
Causation under Sections 4 and 7 of the Clayton Act, 10 Sw. U.L. REV. 667, 674 (1978) (legal

injury in the nature of competitive harm is closely allied to standing).

an early stage in the lawsuit. 14
The Supreme Court in Perkins indirectly addressed the standing
issue. 42 The Court held that one competitively injured is entitled to
bring suit and to present evidence of his damages to a jury. It is not
clear why the court failed to specifically articulate that competitive
injury is necessary for standing to sue in an action brought pursuant
to section 4 of the Clayton Act.' 43 In Payne, the Court again passed
over this issue concluding that the lower court bypassed the issue of
liability for competitive injury.'" The Court's failure to seize the
opportunity to articulate the competitive injury issue in practicable
terms is disconcerting in view of express judicial approval of application of the45 private treble damage remedy to the merger
prohibition.
In Robinson-Patman cases, a preliminary determination of a litigant's standing to sue is clearly justified. The Supreme Court's decision in Payne, however, and its repeated denial of certiorari in price
discrimination cases indicate a hesitancy to break new ground in this
area. Lower federal court decisions have already shown a willingness to adopt the standing approach in Robinson-Patman treble
damage suits.' The Supreme Court might well adopt the standing
141. Not only is the issue of a plaintiff's standing to sue frequently litigated, but also the
doctrine itself is used to dispose of cases at a preliminary stage. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil
Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975); Pollock, Standing, supra note 39, at 6-7.
142.

See supra note 119.

143. Perhaps the Court's silence indicates a reluctance to further develop the RobinsonPatman private treble damage remedy. This reluctance may be due to the Court's failure to
understand the intricacies of the price discrimination action. "In a vain search for precision,
objectivity, and efficiency, courts use simplistic, short-run, static theory to solve complex, longrun, strategic problems." FTC, THE ECONOMICS OF FIRM SiZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND
SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 12 (J. Siegfried ed. 1980) (footnote omitted). See Murray, supra note
2, at 625 (Supreme Court penchant for simplistic rules). The Supreme Court may wish to
"leave well enough alone" and continue to allow dual phase litigation of price discrimination
actions. Note that circuit courts have interpreted the Supreme Court decision in Perkins to
endorse the target area test of standing. Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., 472 F. Supp. 636
(D. Md. 1979), afd, 636 F.2d 1214 (4th Cir. 1980) (without published opinion); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 128 (9th Cir. 1973)
Others suggest that the Court's silence signifies the absence of standing or target area
requirement in Robinson-Patman actions or any antitrust violation because the language of
§ 4 does not explicitly provide a standing requirement. Klingsberg, supra note 127, at 369.
This view ignores the benefits of treating competitive injury as a standing requirement. Finally, other commentators suggest that the courts implicitly apply a target area test. The
Supreme Court's failure to articulate its rationale in traditional standing language has been an
effective means to avoid specifically endorsing a standing to sue test.
144. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
145. Moreover, the standing issue aside, the Court's statement in Payne that, once a violation has been established, the burden to prove antitrust damages is to some extent lightened,
does not aid in defining competitive injury. The Payne decision further confuses the competitive injury issue; it neither explains what burden was lightened, nor to what extent it was
lightened.
146. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa.
1981), the court defined standing in terms of plaintiffs refusal either to show the suffered
injury as a result of the alleged price discriminations or to estimate the amount of damages
attributable to the price discrimination. Without even a minimal showing of injury, the court
would not grant the plaintiff standing. The district court granted summary judgment against

doctrine in these cases, especially since promotion of antitrust policy
is contingent on a practicable approach to competitive injury.
V. Conclusion
Whether competitive injury is a legal issue or a factual issue,
judicial treatment of standing is oftentimes little more than a decisional treatment or memorialization used to disguise a preconceived
policy determination of injury.' 4 7 These policy determinations frequently and unavoidably turn into value judgments of the purpose
and worth of the treble damage remedy and the role and capacity of
the judiciary in antitrust law. The judiciary should not, however,
substitute a value judgment for an analysis of the tort law principles
implicit in the private antitrust damage action. Clearly, the violation
of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act is the breach of duty
requisite to any tort analysis. Having established this statutory
breach, the litigant proves causation, and then damages which result
from the antitrust injury. The competitive injury, however, is not
defined in terms of the causation and injury requirements of tort law.
Indeed, the fact of injury is, to a large degree, not a factual question
at all, but a question of judicial policy. Plaintiff's injury, if factually
attributable to the violation, may nevertheless be noncompensable
because of a lack of competitive injury which is, in the court's language, a lack of causation. In this context, injury and causation are
"factual sounding incantations," which effectively express a value
judgment concerning the point at which the chain of causation
should be severed.' 48 Robinson-Patman opinions and concepts are
always result-oriented. Decisions are often designed to describe or
conceal a sparse factual approach.' 4 9
This uncritical approach to the injury issue taken by most courts
highlights the need for the Supreme Court to explain clearly that a
Robinson-Patman plaintiff must prove more than price discriminaZenith and noted that in addition to its failure to make an adequate showing to support its
standing, Zenith failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on a crucial requirement of
the Robinson-Patman Act, that of proof of substantial incipient injury to competition. Id at
1323-29.
147. In Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982), the Supreme Court stated
the following:
We addressed two issues of "remoteness" in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. [We] found
no warrant in [the Act's] "language or purpose" to engraft an "artificial" limitation
on the reach of the remedy to bar what the court below had termed a "fourth level"
We also rejected the claim that one form of damages claimed by the
injury ....
defendant was not the proximate result of the alleged violations ...
102 S. Ct. at 2547 n. 12 (citations omitted). See Pollock, Injuryand Causation, supra note 46, at
341-45.
148. The task is essentially one of distinguishing a demarcation line with respect to those
claimants whose relationship with the alleged violator and with the affected market is too
tenuous to support recovery.
149. Austem, Presumption and Percipience About Competitive Effect Under Section 2 of the
Clayton Act, 81 HARV. L. REV. 773, 776-77 (1968).

tion. But in order to establish that he sustained antitrust injury, he
need not prove his case twice. A section 4 analysis unquestionably
serves to effectuate the well-understood goals of the antitrust laws.
While not all the difficulties caused by the competitive injury issue
can be resolved merely in the form of a procedural change, the gap
between the traditional Robinson-Patman private remedy analysis
and the traditional section 4 analysis may not be very great. The
presumption on the injury issue is a standing determination on the
liability issue. The jury inference on the causation issue is a question
of sufficiency of the evidence of the extent of damages. This approach is perhaps the only practical way in which private litigants
can vindicate their economic rights in the original spirit of the treble
damage remedy of the antitrust laws.
JANICE C. BERMAN

